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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,

:

Appellee,
v.
JEFFERY SCOTT WORTHINGTON,
Case No. 970668-CA
Appellant.
Priority No. 2

JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS
Utah Code Ann. section 78-2a-3(2)(e) provides this Court's jurisdiction over this criminal
case involving less than first degree felonies.
STATEMENT OF ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW
AND PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE
Did the trial court act within his broad discretion in finding that the interrogation of Mr.
Worthington was custodial?
In reviewing this issue, the Court will defer to the trial court's broad discretion in making
the determination of whether the interrogation was custodial. See e.g. State v.
Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929 (Utah App. 1994).
The issue was raised in the trial court by the motion and supporting memorandum of Mr.
Worthington (R. 36-50), heard at an evidentiary hearing (R. 85-132), addressed in the State's
motion to reconsider and supporting memorandum (R. 62-66), and ruled on by the trial court (R

55-61,68-69,73-74).
It should be noted that in moving the trial court to reconsider the suppression order, the
State merely argued that a finding of custodial interrogation was unsupportable under Mirquet
and did not make any specific objection to the trial court's analysis (R. 62-66).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS
The following constitutional and statutory provisions pertain:
United States Constitution, Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time
of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.
United States Constitution, Amendment XIV § 1
All persons born or naturalized in the united States, and subject tot he
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Mr. Worthington with one count of possession of a controlled
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §58-37-8; and with one count of
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §5837a-5 (R 1-2). Following the preliminary hearing, the magistrate found probable cause, and Mr.
Worthington entered pleas of not guilty (R 19-20).
In district court, counsel for Mr. Worthington filed a motion to suppress and supporting
2

nienuM iiiciinii jigum^ llul si ilniients I'lkri'from,..Mr. Worthington were taken in violation of
Miranda and due process (R. 36-50). After an evidentiary hearing and taking the matter under
advisement to read the preliminary
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,

*^<>n nd^e

Mower granted the motion to suppress (R. 55-61).
On the State's motion (R 62-66), Judge Mower reconsidered his ruling after special
cotisttinafiofi ol State v. Mitquet, u l I I1 ' I 1144 (Utah 1996), and again ruled that the motion to
suppress was granted (R 68-69). Defense counsel prepared a final order of suppression, which
the court *igiu
The State moved to dismiss the case, indicating that the prosecution was unable to
proceed in the absence of the suppressed evidence .
'---•'

au r

k;wei :ii . d,

'mediately filed a notice of appeal from the dismissal order (R. 7b).
STATEMENT OF FACTS

'MIL IIIII

uiHi'il |*11.• nil" ill in.n linlh lln* tM nlenliuiN ln'inniL1

MI lllliu

iiinlniii In Mippiess and

the preliminary hearing, the transcript of which was relied on in support of the motion to suppress
(R 24, 55-61), During the course of these two proceedings, the con \ •;•-. :••: -ignuu n
i oi it i i I in t? tcsl iiiioii i

* ei Sorenson, who was the officer who conducted the

interrogation, from Mi A •• ugton, who was interrogated, and from Mr. Worthington's wife,
\ iiltMi. i i1 :• n?ehmm i*\ hearing and

si.L ^ c
evidentiary hearing on the motion
hearing transcript, the mai ^uu: em.cie.

«,-ss. and alter taking the nine in K*- ie\\ the preliminary
r

h:

.

Because the State has not challenged the trial court's findings of fact by marshaling the
evidence and demonstrating that the evidence is insufficient to support the findings, this ( ourt
3

"assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court and proceeds to a review of the
accuracy of the lower court's conclusions of law and the appUcation of that law in the case." See
State v. Teuscher, 883 P.2d 922, 929-30 (Utah App. 1994).
Thus, Mr. Worthington simply relies on the trial court's ruling for his statement of facts,
and inserts in brackets at the end of each paragraph citations to the record supporting the trial
court's ruling. The trial court's Findings of Fact and Decision states,
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Kim Sorenson is a deputy of the Sevier County Sheriff. On January 6, 1997 he
was on duty and received a request to contact officials at the Georgia Pacific sheet
rock manufacturing plant in Sigurd, Sevier County, Utah. [R. 26, 89].
2. The Deputy went to that location and met with Rob Williams and Richard Hope
of Georgia Pacific. He received from them a small white cardboard box,
approximately 2" by 3" and about an inch deep. There was handwriting inside with
lid which included the name "Scott." [R. 26, 89-90].
3. During a conversation with Mr. Williams and Mr. Hope, the deputy learned of
the following sequence of events.
A. The employee restroom at Georgia Pacific was checked by the
cleaning lady the night before.
B. After the graveyard shift ended on January 6, 1997 the little
white cardboard box was found on the floor in a stall in the same
employee restroom and
C. That the names of employees who had worked the graveyard
shift had been checked and that only one person named Scott who
worked that shift was the defendant Jeffery Scott Worthington. [R.
26-27, 91, 98-99].
4. The deputy took the box and its contents to the Sheriffs office where he met
with another deputy, Delbert Lloyd. Both deputies used what is known as a field
test kit, to examine a substance inside the box which tested positive for being
Methamphetamine. [R. 26, 90]

4

5. The deputy went to the defendant's home. His knock at the door was
responded to by a young child named Keith The defendant at that time was asleep
on the couch. [R. 29, 91-92, 105].
6. Mrs. Worthington came to the door The deputy san; There was an incident
that happened at the mill and Mi V* .rtlrnstov, \-, rh • v •- •-.- one suspect May I
speak with Scott?" [R 29]
7. Mrs. Worthington admitted the deputy into the room where the couch was and
provided a chair for him to sit on next to the couch. The following exchange
occurred between the deputy and the defendant, who was then sitting up on the
couch.
Sorensen: Are you Scott Worthington?
Defendant: Yes.
Sorenson: (retrieving a bag out of his pocket and showing the little white
cardboard box) Have you seen this before?
Defendant: i

i esponse.)

Sorenson: Is the box yours?
Defendant: (No response.)
Soicnsnii I .inn going in name for > ou the items that are inside this box.
Defendant: I have opened the box before and I have seen what is inside, but after
'Kit f put the lid back on and put it away. [R 29, 95]
DECISION
The questions asked by the Deputy amounted to a custodial interrogation Under
those circumstances, the Deputy was required to warn the defendant about his
rights to remain silent and to counsel. No such warnings were given. Hence the
answer is given by the defendant must be suppressed.
The reasons that lead the Court to conclude that this was a custodial interrogation
are as follows:
In terms of the physical place of interrogation, it was obviously the defendant's
home. However, in terms of the defendant's consciousness, it arrived at the place
5

of interrogation from a state of being unconscious or asleep to a state of being
conscious or awake in the presence of a police officer making accusatory
statements. The deputy's attention was focused on the defendant before he ever
arrived at the defendant's home.
(R. 57-61).1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Officer Sorenson awoke Mr. Worthington, verified his identity, and immediately
presented Worthington with a box containing drugs and paraphernalia, and asked Mr.
Worthington two pointed incriminating questions. When Mr. Worthington did not immediately
respond to those questions, the officer threatened to reveal the contents of the box in front of Mr.
Worthington's wife and small son. This amounted to custodial interrogation.
The trial court was fully informed of the governing law, and carefid in reaching his
decision. Because the trial court acted within his discretion, his decision should be affirmed on
appeal.
Alternatively, this Court may affirm the trial court's suppression order on the basis that
statements taken from Mr. Worthington were coerced by Officer Sorenson, and are excluded
from evidence as a matter of constitutional law.

1

At times, the State intimates that the trial court's findings do not go far enough, and
reflect the trial court's failure to understand the governing law. See e ^ Brief of Appellee at 20.
Given the conflicting testimony presented to the trial court, if this Court were in
agreement that the trial court's findings were inadequate, the appropriate remedy would be to
remand the matter for the entry of additional findings, rather than to grant the direct reversal
sought by the State. See e^g. State v. Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 (Utah App. 1990).
Mr. Worthington maintains that the trial court's findings are adequate, and reflect the trial
court's correct interpretation of the law, particularly given this Court's abihty to reasonably infer
all unstated findings consistent with the trial court's ruling.. See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774,
787-88 and n.6 (Utah 1991)(when reasonable, this Court will assume that trial court found facts
not explicitly stated but consistent with its ruling).
6

AROt ML NT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT'S
MIP WiAA ANAI YSIS WAS (*<>!<-•
1 lie Fifth A mendment iu the United States Constitution provides,
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to
be a witness against himself nor be deprived of life, liberty; or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just '
compensation.
A1-. .1 i riiiiiiio'ii law protection of the exercise of the Filth Amendment right against selfincrimination, the United States Supreme Court set forth some general guidelines in Miranda v.
Anzunu. _-.N * . •

., \;llttI_Kiu .

• !MK .Minii-/-- • wishes to present in evidence

statements which stem from custodial interrogation, the gov eminent bears a heavy burden to
show that prior to the statements, the defendant was informe-

- .v_i IUIIU,: * uuii- =. .

md intelligent waiver of those rights before making the statement in issue.
Miranda. 384 U.S. 444-45.
I lii" I'uuil (li'sigjidtcil llir liilliivuiij11 mlmniiiliim In he given to the person prior to
custodial interrogation: 'that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may
be used as evidence against Dim. ana :n.:.
retained or appointed." Id. at 444.
Statements taken in violation of the Miranda warnings requirement are not auini-NM,
ihe gos eiiiiiiciii s cjisc mi i, liiit't Mincey v. ArLuia.

;

/ u.6. 383, 397-98 (1977).

Under federal law, the Miranda requirements come into play only when the accused is

subjected to custodial interrogation, which is defined as 'Svords or actions on the part of the
police that they should have known were reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response,"
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 303 (1980), which occur when the accused is in custody. A
person is considered to be in custody if the person is deprived of his freedom of action in a
significant way that may be equated with formal arrest, in light of an objective assessment of all
facts and circumstances. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; Berkemer v. McCartv, 468 U.S. 420, 442
(1984).

cc

More specifically, Miranda warnings are required whenever the circumstances of an

interrogation are such that they '"exert[] upon [the] detained person pressures that sufficiently
impair his free exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination to require that he be warned of
his constitutional rights.'" State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144, 1146 (Utah 1996), quoting
Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 437.
To determine whether the objective facts establish custodial interrogation, it is appropriate
to consider four factors:
"(1) the site of the interrogation; (2) whether the investigation focused on the
accused; (3) whether the objective indicia of arrest were present; and (4) the length
and form of interrogation."
Mirquet at 1147, quoting Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168, 1171 (Utah 1983).
A fifth factor is sometimes referred to by Utah Courts, "whether the defendant came to the place
of interrogation freely and willingly." State v. Gray, 851 P.2d 1217, 1224 (Utah App), cert.
denied, 860 P.2d 943 (Utah 1993).
Consideration of those factors in the instant case demonstrates the propriety of the trial
court's suppression order.
A. Site of the interrogation
8

The State characterizes the interrog.ihnii iiii Mi

iillimplnn s home i , utiismstul jml

emphasize j-!-ai it occurred in the presence of Woithington "s uite and son, in contending that the
trial court erred in finding custodial interrogation. See Bnei oi \f pciiee a, .
W o 111 ni ni ni 11' i 11 in 11 mi 11 mi ni i

ni in in ni 1111 < iffic IT ' s entry into his home, but awoke to find the

officer there, in the presence of his wife and young son, asking Woithington incriminating

the contents of the box to Woithington while hh wife and son were present

rhis behavior was

coercive. Compare Mirquet, 914 P.2d at 114~ ... , orhcei M a n ^ i ^ m ^au .i diicd utilisation
i»i inti; •

for the traffic stop and told Mirquet that if he did

not retrieve the incriminating contraband, the officer would. The officer's direction to Mirquet
was intended to compel Mirquet to UKC

• Ming - • • >u

apart from the accusation of illegal drug use, was itself coercive,.").
It is well established that custodial interrogation can occur, even in the comic
detained (leisoii"1 nv ill In i nil ,', pitrticnliiilv \ vliieii t h e p e r s o n is a w a k e n e d t o find t h e police, and
does not invite the pohce in Compai e Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 325 (1969)(custodial
interrogation found \Uien \at. about I- a nil In in |inh r otlini" iiiived nil pi'litinnw's
boardinghouse, were admitted by an '"unidentified woman, and were told that petitioner was asleep
in the bedroom
Ilk

V 1 four officers entered the bedroom and began to que^n

imiiciil IK gun v. in i iiani'i

n

ccording to the testimony of one of the officers, petitioner was

not free to go where he pleased but was 'under arrest.'"); with Beckwith v. United States, 425
.

*

-

> /6)(no custodial iiitciiogalKin inuini wiiae ilu/kitni mi inn mini! I

* to discuss tax fraud investigation).
9

Ms into Ms

Particularly where the officer here was acting with a compulsive strategy (intending to
compel Worthington to admit his guilt by threatening to reveal the contents of the box), in finding
custodial interrogation on the unique facts of this case, the trial court certainly did not exceed the
proper bounds of the law. Cf. State v. Kelly. 718 P.2d 385, 391 (Utah 1986)("Although custodial
interrogation may take place in one's own residence, the fact that defendant was in his own home
and had consented to the officer's entry, as well as the absence of any coercive or compulsive
strategy on the officer's part, simply does not suggest the type of abuse Miranda is intended to
prevent.")(citation omitted).
B. Focus of the Investigation
The State intimates that the trial court misunderstood the 'focus of the investigation"
factor in the custody analysis, because the trial court found that Worthington was the clear focus
of the investigation before the officer arrived at Worthington's home, but did not find that
Worthington was informed that he was the focus. Brief of Appellee at 14-17.
The record indicates that the trial court was perfectly well-informed about the significance
of the focus factor. The trial court was clearly informed by both counsel during argument on the
motion to suppress that the subjective focus of the officer on the defendant as the prime suspect
was not dispositive (R. 117-132), and the trial court took the time to read the pertinent authorities
and review the record of the preliminary hearing, over which the court had previously presided
(R. 24; 55-61). After granting the motion to suppress, the trial court reconsidered his ruling,
specifically in light of State v. Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144 (Utah 1996), which focuses on Stansbury
v. California, 114 S.Ct. 1526 (1994), and acknowledges that an unarticulated subjective suspicion
on an officer's part does not contribute to a finding of custodial interrogation, Mirquet at 1148.
10

After consideimy litis •.pecifn issue, he a;;uii) i-» 1 lt»i| nli mi iln> inntii

in suppress was granted (R.

68-69).
The trial court's consideration ot Sorenson s UKIVS u.is|i ifmi liu»iu*o ,int iilli|ci;ii\ cly
I'Liitsuiiiiilile person in Worthington's circumstances would have been well aware of Sorenson's
focusing the investigation on Worthington, whether Sorenson explicitly announced 'his beliefs or
i

in ii

illii

.ill -1 \\ DitliKitidiii In 11ffl^settled the box and after Worthington twice

failed to n t epi responsibility tor the box. Sorenson threat, s, ! »o list the contents of the box,
while Worthington's 'wife and young son . •.-

i. •*

-.mstiHKes, m\ icasonable

person in Worthington's situation would have "understood his status as the focus of the
investigation

See Stansbury, 114 S Ct 1 ^26. 1 ^30 C'\n officer's knowledge or Deiici- .:u
' -u, iu liie individual being

questioned.").
The trial court was acting well within, his discretion in consider kg the officer's focus in
assessing flic officer's credibility. 'In testifying before the trial court, Officer Sorenson maintained

2

' , "«i 111 j!,,!11 I t I""111" 11 11 « ' * • ii (111111 v s the interrogation proceeded as follows:
Sorenson: (retrieving a bag out of his pocket and showing the little wh ite
cardboard box) Have you seen this before9
DetVi'-

<\M*\\^

)

Sorenson: Is the box \ours?
Defendant:

sp-^e >

Sorenson: I am going to name for you the items that are inside this box.
(R. 60).
11

-r

that Worthington was not the focus of his investigation, and that Sorenson's conversation with
Worthington was merely investigatory (R. 95, 99). Rather than relying on the testimony of the
officer in determining what occurred during the actual interrogation, the trial court chose to rely
primarily on the testimony of Worthington's wife, which reflected a far more pointed
interrogation than Sorenson's testimony (R 59). The trial court was well within his discretion in
recognizing that utter lack of credibility in the officer's overall testimony, noting that "[t]he
deputy's attention was focused on the defendant before he ever arrived at the defendant's home."
(R. 60). See Stansburvv. California, 114S.Ct. 1526, 1530 (1994)("Of course, instances may
arise in which the officer's undisclosed views are relevant in testing the credibility of his or her
account of what happened during an interrogation; but it is the objective surroundings, and not
any undisclosed views, that control the Miranda custody inquiry.").
In short, the trial court was acting well within the law in finding that the interrogation was
custodial.
C. Objective Indicia of Arrest
Mr. Worthington concedes that the objective indicia of arrest were lacking — Sorenson
never pulled his gun, and did not cuflf Mr. Worthington until they were outside the home (R 117).
However, Courts have recognized that the objective indicia of arrest factor cannot be
dispositive of the custodial interrogation inquiry, because if it were, the police could delay giving
Miranda warnings simply by delaying formal arrest. See e ^ Mirquet 914 P.2d 1144, 1147 (Utah
1996). Here, Worthington was awakened after sleeping on his couch, and never rose from the
couch or attempted to evade the officer in any way. The officer had no need to resort to his gun
or handcuffs, but nonetheless should have informed Worthington of his Miranda rights. See id
12

(

i

-'ii ui iindiiig custodial

interrogation.
D. Length and Form of tii

r .iuon

While the interrogation in this case was apparently quite brief, the form of the
interrogation was coercive After waking Worthington after his working the graveyard shilL,
Soieiis-i i i'i Iiiiiiii i! I I in lie llu1 cm iinn!ei until he obtained the incriminating concessions
from Worthington he sought Worthington did not consent to the officer's entry7 into his home,
but awoke to .find the officii llieie, in I lie (iieseiite nl Ins vud jiiiiiiill

HIIIIIJJ

s

I^KMU.'

u»---*hm-'tt.i

incriminating questions. When Worthington failed to respond to the questions, the officer
threatened to reveal the contents of the box to Worthington while his wife and son were preseiit,
^uiiipaie Mirquet 914 P.2d at i 147-48 ("Officer Mangelson made a
direct accusation of illegal conduct wholly unrelated to the reason for the traffic stop and told
Mii qua that if he did not retrieve the incriminaiui>

' -

h

V

.lircction to Mirquet was intended to compel Mirquet to take aUion -u ^- J^

-

e incriminating

evidence. That order, apart from the accusation of illegal drug use, was itself coercive.").
E. Whethei tin L>ciuiUtuu Lame to me Place of Interrogation Freely and Willingly
.•1: Worthingtt'i. i; • -^t voluntarih come to be interviewed by Officer Sorenson, but
awoke to find Sorenson standing inh is li v ing i oom, asking a sei ies of h ighly incriminating
questions. These facts support the trial court's finding that custodial interrogation occurred. See
e.g. Orozco v. Texas, supra.3
3

Ihe State's implication that State v. Morreli 803 P.2d 292, 297 (Utah App.), cert denied,
68 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah 1991), has redefined this factor as inquiring '"whether defendant was
taken to the place of interrogation by police against his will[J" Brief of Appellee at 18, is
13

n.
THE SUPPRESSION ORDER
MAY BE AFFIRMED ON THE GROUND
THAT THE INTERROGATION WAS COERCIVE.
This Court is empowered to affirm the judgment of the lower court on any proper ground.
See e.g. Debrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 1995).
As Mr. Worthington argued in the trial court (R. 48-50), one proper basis for suppressing
statements made by Worthington during Officer Sorenson's interrogation of Worthington is that
the statements were coerced.
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments bar use of an accused's statements if they were
involuntarily made. The Fourteenth Amendment requires suppression of confessions obtained
through police misconduct. The due process aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment claim is
explained in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959), as follows:
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not
turn alone on their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deeprooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing he law; that in the end life
and liberty can be as much endangered from illegal methods used to convict those
thought to be criminals as from the actual criminals themselves.
Id. at 321. See also Miller v. Fenton. 474 U.S. 104, 109-11 (!985)(confessions admitted in state
and federal courts must be voluntary under the Fourteenth Amendment, must have been obtained
by government compliance with due process).
In determining whether a statement is voluntary for Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment

incorrect. While this Court did note that the interrogation there ensued because citizens brought
Morrell to the police, rather than the police taking Morrell elsewhere, the proper articulation of
the standard continues to be "'whether the defendant came to the place of interrogation freely and
willingly.'" State v. Gray. 851 P.2d 1217, 1335 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied. 860 P.2d 943
(Utah 1993), quoting Morrell 803 P.2d 292, at 296-97.
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insidei riii,\ i (irn.iye cniulml or other factors brought to bear on the

defendant by the government, and the defendant's ability to resist the coercion. Colorado v.
J

Connelly. \
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whether Miranda was honored, whether the defendant initiated contact with the government
actors, and the defendant's personal characteristics. See e:-g: id.
A ".III1 I iilli

lit ml explained >: Limed States v. Short. 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir.), cert.

denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992), in the Fifth Amendment context,
Incriminating statements obtained by government acts, threats, or promises
that permit the defendant's will to be overborne are coerced confessions running
afoul of the Fifth Amendment and are .inadmissible at trial as evidence of guilt, In
determining whether a particular confession is coerced, some factors we consider
include the intelligence and education of the individual being questioned, whether
he was advised of his constitutional rights, the length of detention, the prolonged
nature of the questioning, and whether the individual was physically punished.
Since no single factor is determinative, w e must be mindful of all the surrounding
circumstances, including the defendant's characteristics.
Id. at 1449 (citations omitted).
Reviewing the facts of this case demonstrates that suppression of the statements is
appropiiate on these constitutional grounds. At the time of the interrogation, Mr. ""Worthington
! : ained his G.E.D. and had attended two years at
Trade Tech, and suffered from an unspecified learning disability (R 105-106). He had been in jail
once before several years pn

< -

*'- m«j

'interrogated by the police (R. 106).
Having worked the graveyard shift, Worthington was asleep when I Hhcct Soienson
>ni *

. ing the interrogation, but was unable to stay awake (R.

108-109).
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Officer Sorenson was immediately domineering and aggressive with Mr. Worthington, and
after presenting the box containing drugs and paraphernalia, asked him multiple incriminating,
coercive questions without giving Worthington the benefit of a Miranda warning. When
Worthington did not immediately concede his guilt, the officer threatened to reveal the contents of
the box, while Worthington's wife and small son were nearby. See Statement of Facts, Point I of
the Argument section of this brief, supra.
On these facts, this Court may affirm the trial court's suppression order on the basis that
the statements made by Worthington were coerced by Officer Sorenson within the meaning of the
United States Constitution. See e ^ Short, supra.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the ruling of the trial court.
Respectfully submitted this

<

day of_AAjL±L

, 1998.
^

DOUGEAS L. NEELE^
Attorney for Mr. Worthington
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